to be competed
Introduction
There is little doubt the …nancial strength ratings issued by the dominant insurance rating agencies can have a signi…cant impact on the opinions of participants in the insurance marketplace and therefore on the functioning of the market itself. Yet surprisingly little is known about the incentives of the agencies, how well the ratings perform over time, and how one agency's system performs relative to another's. We know of only one study that has looked at the determinants of insurance company …nancial strength ratings across multiple rating agencies and they document signi…cant di¤erences across the various systems (Pottier and Sommer 1999).
However, a shortcoming of the research is that the author's do not have any reason to suspect why the rating should di¤er. The purpose of this paper is to both theoretically and empirically investigate the incentives a single rating agency has to produce ratings and then ask how those ratings are likely to change when another agency enters the market.
We begin by considering the ratings process itself. First, consider that the rating agencies themselves can be judged only in reference to the quality of the models and the data employed.
Better formulated models with richer data should, one assumes, outperform more primitive models. But the choice of models might be constrained by modeling technology and the data limited to what is accessible. However, within these constraints, rating agencies can choose how much they wish to invest in model building, how much invest in data and how they will interpret the results. The question we address is whether these choices are a¤ected by competition between agencies and how that competition impacts the ultimate ratings.
The information content of …nancial ratings is of great interest to many actors and an extensive empirical literature exists. Earlier empirical papers tended to look predict the ratings (e.g. from public information) though many later papers mainly sought to examine the accuracy of rating, i.e., their ability to predict default. Other papers have asked whether ratings contain information that is not already impounded in the prices of …nancial instruments. The accuracy of rating is clearly of immense practical importance. Yet little attention has been given to understanding the economic mechanisms that determine rating accuracy. Is accuracy purely determined by the available data and computational capacity? Or is accuracy the result of economic choices and market forces?
We will develop a model of rating in which, …rst there is a single rating agency that acts as a monopolist. In this sense, the agency charges a fee to …rms. Receiving a high rating can enhance the value of the …rm, e.g., because it lowers the cost of debt and may permit the …rm to access some customers that would otherwise be o¤ limits. The monopolist rating agency is then able to price for its services to extract all rent. However, it can manipulate these rents by its choice of both the accuracy and stringency of the rating scheme. We will then introduce a second agency and address a duopoly in which …rms compete on both stringency and accuracy. Like all oligopoly models, di¤erent equilibria are possible and, since we are unable to obtain a closed form, we will illustrate a Cournot solution. However, since our purpose is to understand the actual dynamics of new entry into the insurance rating market (the entry of Standard & Poor's to compete with the incumbent A. M. Best), we will use the reaction functions to speculate on the temporal evolution of the market after entry. We will then see how the incumbent and entrant actual behaved in terms of their choices of accuracy and stringency.
Our model has some roots in Lizzeri, 1999 and De, Kale and Shahrur, 2003 . Lizzeri …rst considers as monopoly rating agency and shows that maximize surplus by "certifying" …rms according to whether they exceed a threshold. The monopoly agency can earn a large portion of the surplus in spite of the fact that this certi…cation conveys relatively little information.
However, if there is competition between rating agencies, there is a full information equilibrium in which intermediaries make no pro…ts. This paper di¤ers from ours in several respects the most important of which is that we look multiple ratings in which insurers competes in its joint choices of its costly investment in accuracy and in stringency. While di¤erent oligopoly equilibria are feasible, and are illustrated, we are mainly concerned with explaining the actual entry of new rating agencies into the insurance industry. Accordingly, our main interest is in the properties of the reaction functions.
De, Kale and Shahrur, 2003 , look at the demand for ratings under di¤erent assumptions about rating accuracy. Customers are assumed to know the accuracy and they show equilibria in which all high quality and some low quality …rms are rated according to a less than perfectly accurate standard. We di¤er in looking at both stringency and accuracy and in considering the e¤ects of new entry. The focus on stringency, as well as accuracy, echoes earlier empirical work on bond ratings (Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 1998) and insurance ratings (Doherty and Phillips, 2002) which showed that rating downgrades in the 1980's and 1990's could be explained by increasing stringency, as opposed to declines in credit quality. We are interested in whether this increased stringency in the insurance industry can be explained by the competitive e¤ects of new entry.
We build a model that analyzes the behavior of the rating agency when it decides both stringency and precision of its advice. We consider a situation in which the insurance industry is composed of …rms with heterogeneous insolvency risks. The rating agency possesses a technology to estimate the insolvency risk, but the precision of the estimate is costly for the agency. This information is valuable to risk averse customers. It may also be valuable to insurance companies who wish to signal high reliability, and, ultimately, increase the price a customer is ready to pay for a particular contract.
An agency also decides the stringency of its rating. Once estimates are obtained, the way they are aggregated in rating categories a¤ects the expected probability of default in each category.
One of the key features of the model is that the insurance company is not obliged to obtain a rating. Therefore, precision and stringency decisions must take into account incentives of …rms to participate in rating.
The objective of the model is to explain the recent started employed by S&P to enter insurance ratings traditionally dominated by a single company, AM Best.
The outline of the analysis is as follows. We start by considering the precision choice by a single agency. Then we study the incentives of an agency to pool heterogeneous estimates in di¤erent categories (stringency). Then we allow for the possibility of entry, and analyze which …rms may have incentives to obtain a second opinion. In general these are the …rms that either have been overestimated in terms of insolvency risk, or …rms that have been pooled with less favorable risk types in the rating process. Therefore, the new entrant is general will be characterized by higher precision and also higher stringency of ratings. We also analyze how the presence of the "second opinion" competitor a¤ects the accuracy and stringency strategy of the incumbent rating agency.
The model
We consider interaction among three groups of agents -a unit mass of insurance companies, insurance company is its insolvency risk. Customers are risk averse and are willing to pay for the insurance contract in accordance to the insolvency risk of the issuing company. Insurer cannot credibly communicate its insolvency risk. However, an intermediary possesses a technology that allows to estimate the risk. Also, it has the reputation to communicate its …ndings to customers.
We assume that there are three types of companies with insolvency risks 1 < 2 < 3 , and
. A company 1 has the lowest probability to become insolvent, while a company with 3 has the highest probability.
The rating agency has two decisions to make. First, it chooses the precision of the estimate r i , i = 1; 2; 3 of the insolvency risk, so that the resulting estimate coincides with the true value of insolvency risk with probability ; that is,
We assume that the signal is informative, and Second, the agency decides the stringency of the rating schedule. We assume that an agency can assign an exogenously given number of categories, K = 2. Denote these two categories A and B. Then, the stringency is endogenously determined by the partition of fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 g in two
subintervals. An example of the rating system is illustrated on Figure 1 . The company that is assigned rating A has low risk, while the company with B rating has high risk. We refer to the system with A = fr 1 g; B = fr 2 ; r 3 g as more stringent and to the one with A = fr 1 ; r 2 g and B = fr 3 g as less stringent. Customers are aware of the rating system used by the agency, but they observe only the rating assigned to the company. They do not know the actual estimate of insolvency risk produced by the rating agency.
Obtaining ratings is voluntary for insurance companies. Thus the payo¤ of the rating agency is determined by the demand for ratings. Each company pays an exogenously given fee t for rating services. Then the payo¤ of the agency,
where is the share of companies that decide to obtain ratings, 2 f0; 1 3 ; 2 3 ; 1g. Customers are risk averse. Their valuation of the insurance contract depends on the estimate of the company's insolvency risk and precision of the rating. For simplicity we consider a situation in which customers observe the rating agency's choice of . The valuation of the contract of a company with insolvency risk i is v i , with v 1 > v 2 > v 3 > 0. Customers are risk averse, and the valuation of insurance contract from a company with rating K; K = fA; B; N g, where N stands for no rating, depends on the expected insolvency risk and precision of information,
The …rst part is the expected valuation of the contract. The second part, with a > 0; is a measure of customers'risk aversion.
The insurance company sets a price p for the contract. A customer is willing to buy a contract if and only if
Thus the price of the contract is
A rating agency imposes a fee t for the rating services 1 . Then the payo¤ of the insurance company is
where I k = 1, if company is assigned a rating k 2 fA; Bg; 0; if company is not rated, k = N .
We study Bayesian Perfect equilibria of the game. Strategies of all players must be optimal
given the beliefs about other's players information. Beliefs must be consistent with the Bayes rule whenever possible.
1 In accordance with the industry practice, the fee does not depend on the rating grade assigned to a company.
Full disclosure benchmark
To highlight the nature of trade-o¤s that drive our results we …rst analyze a situation in which the estimate produced by the rating agency is disclosed to customers. In other words, we study a choice of precision under the rating schedule fr 1 g; fr 2 g; fr 3 g:
An insurance company decides to obtain a rating only if the expected pro…t gained with rating is higher than the one without a rating. At the same time, the expected value of the contract without a rating depends on the composition of the pool of non-rated companies and customers'beliefs concerning the pool.
Suppose that the low risk company 1 is not rated, and the other two are rated. Then if 2 decides not to be rated, it obtains
while if it is rated, its payo¤ is
Thus, in this case type 2 also decides not to be rated. Note that type 3 would also prefer not to be rated because it obtains higher expected payo¤ by pooling with better types. Therefore, it not possible to have an equilibrium in which a low risk company decides not to obtain a rating, while higher risk companies are rated.
Suppose now that none of the companies are rated, and 1 decides to be rated. Then it increases its expected payo¤ by signalling to be low risk. In response, type 2 is better o¤ by obtaining a rating. Finally, type 3 may decide either way, depending on the fee t and the precision of the signal. Hence, in equilibrium it must be that either all three types are rated, or type 3 is the one that decides not to obtain a rating. Also, out-of-equilibrium, if a company i ; i = 1; 2 decides not to be rated, it will be considered by customers as type 3 .
The decision of 3 whether to be rated depends on the precision of the technology employed by the rating agency. If the technology is poor, 3 may bene…t when it is mistaken for a better type. So 3 decides to be rated when
where Ev( 3 ) denoted the expected valuation of the contract o¤ered by 3 when it is rated.
When all types are rated, the expected values of contracts with estimates r i , i = 1; 2; 3 are
Then the expected valuation of 3 's contract when this type decides to be rated is
Similarly,
How does higher precision of estimates a¤ect the incentives of the high risk company to be rated? Consider
The …rst term of this expression is negative because higher precision of the rating implies that the high risk type is less often mistaken for the low risk type. Consequently, it obtains expected valuation of its contract is lower. The second term is positive and it indicates that higher risk aversion of customers increases the price they are willing to pay for more precise information.
To characterize the equilibrium level of precision, we consider three cases when = 1, = 2 3 and = 1 3 : Case 1: Full coverage of the market. In this case the optimal precision of the rating agency solves the problem max t ( ) subject to
The participation constraints guarantee that all companies indeed choose to obtain ratings.
Since Ev( 1 ) Ev( 2 ) Ev( 3 ), the last constraint P C 3 implies the other two participation constraints. Thus,
and the expected pro…t of the rating agency is
Thus the optimal precision is determined by the …rst order condition
satis…ed as an equality when > 1 3 :
When customers do not value precision of information o¤ered by the rating agency, a = 0, the optimal precision of the estimate is zero, = 1 3 . Higher risk aversion implies higher optimal precision. It is interesting to compare this result with Lizzeri (1999) . In his model the rating agency does not invest in precision and nonetheless manages to obtain full coverage of the market.
Our result may help to understand how such an outcome is possible. When customers do not value precision of information, full coverage of the market is obtained due to pooling e¤ect: High risk companies are willing to obtain ratings because pooling with low risk companies increases the expected valuation of their contract. At the same time, low risk companies obtain ratings in order not to be considered as high risk companies by the customers. The structure of the equilibrium implies that the rating agency's payo¤ is increasing with pooling, and therefore, it's optimal precision level is zero. Therefore, to obtain positive precision in equilibrium, it must be the case that customers are willing to pay for precision. Higher values of a thus imply higher equilibrium level of precision.
Case 2: Partial coverage. Suppose now that type 3 decides not to obtain a rating. Then a rating agency designs a system that satis…ed the following participation constraints.
The …rst constraint states that type 2 is willing to be rated while the second constraint guarantees that type 3 decides not to obtain a rating. The optimal precision of the rating agency is a solution to
The bene…t of serving only two types is that a rating agency can extract a higher share of the surplus.
[to be completed] 4 Partial disclosure and optimal stringency
In this section we focus on the case where a monopoly rating agency provides full coverage of the market, and consider two alternative rating systems -more stringent and less stringent. Under more stringent system companies with risk estimate r 1 are assigned rating A, while companies with estimate r 2 and r 3 are assigned rating B. Under less stringent system, rating A is assigned under estimates r 1 and r 2 , while B is assigned under r 3 . We also show that partial disclosure is more pro…table than full disclosure presented in the previous section.
Stringent rating system
Since companies with insolvency risks 2 and 3 are pooled together under this system, the expected values of contract for companies with ratings A and B are
The expected value of high risk company's contract when it obtains a rating is
Thus it decides to be rated when
Optimal precision of the rating agency solves
resulting in that is implicitly de…ned by
It is straightforward to show that optimal precision is increasing in the degree of risk-aversion.
Also it is decreasing in the diversity of companies in the industry.
Non-stringent rating system
Under less stringent system companies with estimates r 1 and r 2 are pooled together by the rating agency. When the rating agency covers all the market, the expected value of contracts that obtain ratings A and B are
Then, the expected value of the contract for a rated high risk company is
and it obtains a rating when
Optimal level of precision under this system solves
resulting in the level of precision implicitly de…ned by
Similarly to the results above, the optimal level of precision under this system is increasing in the degree of risk aversion and decreasing in the diversity of the market.
Optimal stringency
Denote ( ) and ( ) the expected pro…t of the rating agency under these two systems. It can be easily shown that
; 1]; and therefore, a stringent system is optimal.
Proposition 1 Under monopoly, a stringent rating system is optimal.
There are two types of costs. First, providing precision is has direct cost ( ). Second, it has indirect costs of providing incentives to the high risk company to demand a rating. A high risk company bene…t of a rating comes from the increased expected surplus of its contract when it is pooled with a better company. Under more stringent system a pooling is naturally obtained for any given level of precision, and as a result, providing incentives is less costly.
A stringent rating system is also optimal when an agency is free to disclose all information.
Remarkably, the optimal level of precision can be either higher or lower than under less stringent system, depending on the characteristics of the industry. When v 2 > 1 2 (v 1 + v 3 ), more stringent system results is better precision that the less stringent one. However, when
, less stringent system leads to better precision.
Entry of a second rating agency
In this section we study an equilibrium rating system when a second rating agency enters the market. We distinguish between short run and long run equilibria. In the short run, we consider a rating system of the incumbent rating agency as given, and study the optimal entry strategy of the second rating agency. In the long run, incumbent and entrant compete on the market simultaneously.
Short run equilibrium
Consider a situation when a …rm that have obtained a rating from the incumbent rating agency is o¤ered an opportunity to purchase a second rating. What is a potential market for the entrant? As we have argued above, there are three reasons why an insurance company may be willing to be rated. First, rating signals its insolvency risk. Second, rating may increase the expected value of its contract by pooling with better types. Third, information is valued by risk-averse customers. Obtaining a second rating increases the precision of information about the company's insolvency risk. Thus it may not provide extra surplus to high risk companies due to pooling e¤ect. At the same time, obtaining a second rating allows a low risk company to con…rm its quality. The bene…t is the highest for the company that has been mistaken for the high risk one by the incumbent rating agency. Hence the entrant's target group is composed of low risk companies. The analysis presented below con…rms this intuition.
Before evaluating the potential bene…ts of obtaining a second rating, let us discribe entrant's information technology. The information structure of the entrant's signal is the same as the one of the incumbent de…ned by (1). Denote e the precision of the signal obtained by the entrant.
The cost of precision is c ( e ), where c > 0 measures the e¢ ciency of entrant's technology compared to one of the incumbent. We assume that conditional on true insolvency risk of the insurance company, signals of the two rating agencies are independent. Entrant imposes a fee t e for the rating services. The pro…t of the entrant is
where e is entrants share of the market.
The decision to purchase a second rating depends on the surplus gained from receiving a second rating and the price of the rating. Consider a …rm rated R by the incumbent rating agency. Denote v(R) the valuation of its contract by the customers. Obtaining a second rating results in expected valuation E e v(R; R e ). A company decides to obtain a second rating when its pro…ts with two ratings is higher that with a single rating, that is,
The right hand side of the last condition is the extra bene…t of the second rating. The left hand side is the cost of the second rating.
We study Bayesian equilibria of the game. The rating system of the entrant must be optimal given the incumbent's rating system and insurance company's decision to obtain a second rating.
The company's decision must be optimal given the rating system and evaluation of the rated contract by the customers.
Obtaining a second rating is not attractive to high risk companies.
Proposition 2 There is no short-run equilibrium in which a second rating is obtained only by type 3 ; or only by types 2 and 3 .
The bene…ts of a second rating for low risk types depend on the rating system employed by the entrant. We consider di¤erent scenarios of rating systems below.
I. Only 1 obtains a second rating.
Obtaining a second rating by 1 reveals its insolvency risk to customers and guarantees the highest payo¤ v 1 . Depending on the rating A or B assigned by the incumbent rating agency, there are two groups of companies with insolvency risk 1 . The marginal bene…t of the company depends on the rating assigned by the incumbent rating agency. Thus to have all 1 companies demanding ratings, two participation constraints must be satis…ed.
Naturally, the marginal bene…t obtained by a company that obtained rating B from the incumbent rating agency is higher than the marginal bene…t of the company rated A by the incumbent.
This observation creates two possible strategies for the entrant: It may design a rating system that encourages all 1 companies to obtain a second rating. In this case its fee is determined by P C A . Alternatively, it may focus on companies that have obtained a low rating from the incumbent, and demand a higher fee.
I.1 All 1 companies obtain a second rating. In this case the mass of companies covered by the entrant is e = 1 3 ; and the pro…t of the entrant writes
resulting in precision e implicitly de…ned by
Note that for relatively low values of customers risk aversion a providing imprecise rating can be optimal for the entrant rating agency. When all companies with low insolvency risk obtain a second rating, the self selection of companies is a signal about their quality.
This rating system creates strong incentives for the other insurance companies to obtain a second rating. Indeed, by doing so they are mistaken for the low risk company. Hence, this
scenario cannot be part of equilibrium.
I.2 Only 1 companies rated B by the incumbent obtain a second rating. The size of the market covered by the entrant depends on the precision of the incumbent rating agency,
The entrant gains pro…t
The optimal precision under this system is implicitly de…ned by
Precision of the information o¤ered by the entrant is higher than in the previous case because the company's marginal bene…t of obtaining a rating is increasing in precision.
Given that precision of the entrant is su¢ ciently high, types 2 and 3 may not bene…t by obtaining the second rating. Thus this entry strategy may be optimal.
II. Types 1 and 2 obtain a second rating.
Consider a possibility that 2 also purchases a second rating. In this case the marginal bene…t of the second rating depends on the stringency of the rating system of the entrant. We consider two cases depending on whether companies with di¤erent estimates are assigned the same or di¤erent ratings.
II.1. 1 and 2 are assigned the same rating. Beliefs of customers concerning company's insolvency risk depends on the rating and precision of the incumbent. Denote R e the second rating. Since both types obtain the same rating, the rating of entrant only signals that a company can be one of two types. Then beliefs about the company with rating A from the incumbent are
Similarly, beliefs about a company with rating B from the incumbent are
The participation constraint of each type depends on the rating obtained from the incumbent.
II.2. Companies with di¤erent estimated are assigned di¤erent ratings. Suppose that the entrant assigns rating A to a company with an estimate r 1 and a rating B to a company with an estimate r 2 . Beliefs of customers about the type of the company when it obtains rating R from the incumbent and R e from the entrant are
Beliefs about type 2 can be derived from the condition that Pr( 2 j R; R e ) = 1 Pr( 1 j R; R e ):
The participation constraints are as follows.
The entrant may design a system that covers all companies 1 and 2 regardless the rating obtained from the incumbent rating agency. Alternatively, it may focus on particular groups of companies. [compare these alternatives.]
Long run equilibrium
In the long run, insurance companies have a possibility to purchase one or two ratings. In this case the rating systems of the entrant and the incumbent need to be considered simultaneously.
In line with the analysis presented above, the incentives to buy a second rating arise from the ability to signal high quality to the market and to increase the valuation that customers are ready to pay for the contract. Since second rating provide better information about the quality of the company, high risk companies have no incentives to demand a second rating.
[segmentation of the market, stringency of the incumbent and the entrant, impact on precision]
Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically investigate the accuracy and stringency of the ratings assigned by Today, S&P provides ratings on insurers that represent in excess of 80 percent of the assets of the industry -more than any other rating company except Weiss Research.
In this study we obtained data on all ratings assigned to property-liability insurers by A.M.
Best The benchmark we use to investigate these questions is the probability of default for each …rm in our data set. The one-year probability of default is a reasonable benchmark since both agencies state the primary objective of their rating systems is to provide an opinion about the insurer's ability to meet its contractual obligations to policyholders. We use these probabilities to estimate the stringency of the rating system by looking at either the median or mean probability of default for a given rating class. Presumably companies with lower probabilities of default should, on average, expect to receive higher ratings from each agency. More stringent ratings standards are said to exist when the average probability of default for insurers in a particular rating class is lower for one agency than the other.
The accuracy of the rating system will be measured by looking at the amount of dispersion of the estimated default probabilities conditional upon rating class. We use two measures of dispersion: First, the standard deviation of estimated probabilities for a particular rating class;
and second, the di¤erence between companies at the 90th percentile of the estimated probabilities for a particular rating class versus companies at the 10th percentile. Either measure of dispersion should give us an idea of the amount of noise in the rating category from each agency. Unfortunately most, if not all of these models discussed can be considered static models as they are typically implemented using data that spans only one or just a few years of data. At a minimum, these static models are inadequate for the long-term panel data that we assembled for this study. In addition, recent research suggests that arbitrarily choosing when to observe each …rm's characteristics leads to unnecessary selection bias problems and reduced forecasting ability (Theodossiou 1993) .
Estimating Default Probabilities: Methodology and Data
In this study we use the discrete-time hazard model suggested by Shumway (2001) to overcome the biases of the static models and to take advantage of our panel data. The hazard model approach has at least two primary advantages over the more traditional static models. First, hazard model allow for time-varying covariates that explicitly recognize the …nancial health of some …rms may deteriorate over time even though the …rm does not declare bankruptcy. Static models, on the other hand, only make comparisons between …rms that are classi…ed as healthy or not healthy at just one point in time and they therefore ignore …rms that are at risk of bankruptcy even though they do not become bankrupt. Shumway shows ignoring this information creates a selection bias which leads to biased an inconsistent parameter estimates. Intuitively, hazard models correct this problem by allowing the researcher to extract useful information from the times series data on each individual …rm. In addition, it can be shown that the parameter estimates from hazard models are unbiased and consistent.
The second reason the hazard model may be preferred to static models is that they allow the researcher to exploit all available information about the …rm rather than just the last year's observations. Thus, the models are more e¢ cient because the increased amount of data increases e¢ ciency which yields more reliable parameter estimates and better out-of-sample forecasting results.
Implementing the discrete-time hazard model is rather straight forward since it can be shown that the likelihood function of a discrete time hazard model is identical to the likelihood function The explanatory variables we use to estimate the hazard model are nineteen of the balance sheet and income statement ratios that make up the NAIC's FAST solvency tracking system.
We use the FAST variables for several reasons. First, the FAST system utilizes all of the same ratios used in the older solvency tracking system IRIS but includes several new variables that have been shown to have additional predictive power. Thus, the FAST ratios should provide more accurate bankruptcy probabilities than the IRIS system variables alone.
The second reason we use the FAST variables is due to research by Grace, Harrington and Klein (1995) who test the FAST system plus a controls for …rm size and organizational form against alternative speci…cations that include additional audit ratios. The authors conclude there were diminishing marginal returns to incorporating additional balance sheet and income statement ratios not already included in the FAST system plus the two control variables. Thus, short of adopting information from alternative modeling methodologies (e.g., simulation), the FAST system seems to capture as much predictive power as can be gleaned from …nancial statement ratios alone.
The variable we use to control for …rm size equals the natural logarithm of the real assets of the …rm where the price de ‡ator we use is the Consumer Price Index. The organization form control variable is an indicator set equal to 1 if the insurer either belongs to a mutual or reciprocal group of insurers or is a single insurer that is either a mutual or a reciprocal.
Otherwise the indicator variable is set equal to zero.
As discussed above, we estimate the hazard models using all insurers for which we have data to calculate the FAST ratios. Thus, we include insurers rated by A.M Best and/or Standard & Poor's and also insurers that do not receive ratings from either of these two agencies. The only insurers we delete from the analysis are those with insu¢ cient data needed to calculate the nineteen FAST variables or those who do not have data available in the year prior to their …rst event year. In an e¤ort to include as many insolvent observations in the analysis, we also include insurers who report data two years prior to their …rst event year but who do not report in the year prior to their …rst event year. We delete any bankrupt …rms for which we were unable to locate data within 2 years of their …rst event year. The …nal data set contains 24,062 solvent …rm-year observations and 214 insolvent …rm-year observations.
Estimating Default Probabilities: Summary Statistics and Regression Results
Summary statistics for the solvent and insolvent company observations are shown in Table 1 .
Not surprisingly tests between the means of the solvent and insolvent samples suggest the two groups of insurers di¤er signi…cantly across a number of dimensions. Insolvent insurers carry signi…cantly higher leverage ratios (the Kenney Ratio and the reserves to policyholder surplus ratio) than do solvent insurers. Insolvent insurers are signi…cantly smaller in terms of asset size than are solvent insurers and less likely to be members of a mutual. Insolvent insurers pay out signi…cantly more cash relative to premiums collected than do solvent insurers and they much more reliant on reinsurance (see the surplus aid to policyholder surplus ratio).
The results of the discrete-time hazard model are shown in Panel A of Table 2 . Overall the explanatory power of the model is reasonable as the pseudo R2 statistic is 26 percent.
The results are consistent with many of the inferences that were discussed after reviewing the summary statistics shown in Table 1 . The estimated beta coe¢ cients suggest highly levered …rms, rapidly growing …rms, and …rms that rely more heavily upon reinsurance to increase policyholder surplus are associated with higher failure rates. Larger …rms and insurers that are part of mutual organizations are relatively safe. Finally, …rms that have high cash out ‡ows relative to in ‡ows or who experience adverse reserve development are more likely to fail.
Looking at the estimated probabilities of default is another way to judge the reasonableness of the estimated hazard model. Summary statistics of the estimated one-year probabilities of default are shown in Panel B of Table 2 . The average/median probability of default for the healthy …rms is 0.8/0.2 percent while the average/median statistics for the …rms in the year before they become bankrupt is 9.4/4.5 percent. Thus, the average probability of default for bankrupt …rms is over 10 times larger than the average probability for healthy …rms. Clearly the model does a reasonable job assigning high default probabilities to …rms that ultimately fail and low probabilities to healthy …rms.
Stringency and Accuracy Tests: A.M. Best vs. Standard & Poor' s
In this section we present statistics on the distribution of the ratings assigned by A.M. Best and S&P over the time period of this study. After presenting the general trends, we then compare and contrast the stringency and accuracy of the two rating systems.
In order to compare Best's rating systems with S&P's we need to de…ne a mapping between the di¤erent symbols used by the two agencies. Unfortunately there is not a one-to-one mapping between two systems and prior research comparing insurance ratings across agencies have used di¤erent de…nitions. For this study we reviewed the verbal descriptions each agency ascribes to the individual ratings and decided to use the …ve rating categories shown in Table 3 . Numerical values, also shown in the table, are assigned to each rating category to facilitate comparisons across agencies and over time. In addition to the coverage statistics, Table 4 Table 5 . Contrary to the hypothesis, the average and median probability of default statistics are always lower for S&P than they are for A.M. Best suggesting the …rms tracked by S&P are typically of higher …nancial quality …rms -not lower. The non-parametric
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of equal medians for all nine years and the parametric t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means in seven out of nine years.
Since the …nancial quality of …rms rated by S&P appears, on average, to be better than Bests, another possible explanation for the di¤erence in opinion may be because S&P entered this market by employing higher standards. Before we can investigate this possibility, however, we …rst need to review how S&P entered this market.
Prior to 1991, S&P provided coverage to only a small number of property-liability insurers (approximately 100). However, in 1991, S&P dramatically expanded their coverage by introducing a new rating service they called "Insurance Solvency Review."The primary enhancement in the new service was that S&P increased the number of …rms it covered by o¤ering a "quali…ed ratings"in addition to their traditional ratings. The methodology used to determine a quali…ed rating for an insurer di¤ered in at least three important ways from the traditional manner. First, quali…ed ratings were solely based upon publicly available data. Thus, unlike the traditional method, S&P analysts did not interview or speak to the management of an insurer prior to issuing the quali…ed rating. Second, individual insurers were not required to request the rating or to a pay a fee to receive the quali…ed rating. Finally, the third important di¤erence was that S&P had a policy that no insurer could receive above a BBB rating using the quali…ed methodregardless of the characteristics of the company. S&P ultimately relaxed this position following signi…cant criticism from the industry and began to issue quali…ed ratings above BBB in 1994. Table 6 shows summary statistics regarding the types of ratings, quali…ed versus unquali…ed,
given by S&P over this time period. In 1992, S&P issued 360 ratings of which 337, or 94 percent, were determined using the quali…ed rating system. Only 23 …rms received a full rating in 1992.
Over time, however, more …rms agreed to be obtain a full rating and by 2000 over 300 propertyliability insurers paid to receive an unquali…ed rating. Similar to Best's, the average full rating declined slightly over time from a high of 3.2 in 1992 to 2.8 by the end of the time period.
The average quali…ed rating increased over time from a low of 0.5 in 1992 to 1.2 by year 2000.
However, even after 1994 when S&P removed the restriction that …rms could not receive a rating above BBB on a quali…ed basis, the average quali…ed rating is always signi…cantly less than the average rating given using the traditional methodology.
We know from Table 6 the average ratings issued by S&P di¤er signi…cantly across the two rating methodologies. But do the …rms di¤er? In addition, how did the standards S&P used to assign ratings di¤er from A.M Best? To answer these questions consider Table 7 which shows summary statistics regarding the default probabilities of …rms rated by A.M Best's and those rated by S&P's on a quali…ed and unquali…ed basis.
First, consider the stringency of the standards employed across the three rating technologies.
There is clearly a natural ordering within each rating technology: …rms that received higher ratings had, on average, lower probabilities of default. For example, the average probability of default for …rms rated by A.M. Best increases monotonically by rating category from a low of 0.25 percent for …rms rated "Extremely Strong" to a high of 3.11 percent for …rms that received the lowest rating "Marginal."A similar pattern can be seen for S&P …rms that received either a full or quali…ed rating. The results suggest that at least, on average, each of the three technologies required …rms to be less likely to default in order to receive a higher rating. Now consider the stringency across rating technologies. Figure 2 graphically displays the average probability of default of the …rms over the time period of this study by rating category across each of the three rating technologies (the data can be seen in Table 7 ). It is easy to see the stringency employed by A.M. Best and S&P are almost identical when S&P issued a full unquali…ed rating. This is particularly true in the higher rating categories (Extremely Strong, Strong, and Good) where the average probability of default for …rms in the categories was almost identical. In stark contrast, however, is the case when S&P issued an unquali…ed rating. In this case we …nd the average probability of default was substantially lower in each rating category relative to Bests and S&P's own full rating standards. For example, …rms that received an adequate rating (BBB) from S&P on a quali…ed basis had an average probability of default equal to 0.22 percent. A …rm with a default probability of 0.22 percent likely would have received either an Extremely Strong (AAA) or a Strong (AA) rating if S&P was using their full rating standards.
It is also interesting to consider the accuracy of the assignment of ratings across rating categories. Figure 3 displays the di¤erence between the 90th and 10th percentile of the probability of default for …rms in each rating category (the data can be seen in Table 7 ). The comparison across rating technologies is very similar to the conclusions that were drawn regarding stringency. S&P's full rating system and A.M Best's methodology had almost the same amount of noise in each rating category. The only exception to this general conclusion is the Marginal rating category where Best appears to have a wider range of default probabilities for …rms in that category. This seems reasonable since Best rated many more insurers than did S&P and many of these are small insurers with lower …nancial quality (see Figure 2 where the average probability of default for insurers rated marginal by Best is also signi…cantly higher than the average for insurers rated marginal by S&P). S&P's quali…ed rating system, however, had signi…cantly less noise than Bests or S&P's full rating system.
There are two possible explanations for the results shown in Table 7 . Cleary one possibility is that the standards S&P employed when they issued quali…ed ratings were much more stringent than those they used when the insurer paid a fee to receive a full rating. In addition, it suggests S&P very carefully choose insurers to issue a quali…ed rating to and then carefully placed those insurers in rating categories lower than what they would have received had they agreed to pay for a full rating methodology. Then, when the insurer agreed to pay a fee to receive a full rating, S&P would move some insurers into a more appropriate rating category or, in the language of our theoretical model, would misclassify some insurers which showed up as an increased amount of noise in the full rating system.
A second explanation for the results we show in Figures 2 and 3 is that it is possible, if not probable, that our econometric model does not fully capture all information that would be useful to determine the default probability of each insurer. More speci…cally, when a …rm agrees to pay for a full rating, S&P analysts presumably learn private information about the …rm which is then factored into the ultimate ratings. Therefore, all we may be picking up is that we have an omitted variable problem since we only include publicly available information in our hazard model. Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to control for the information that S&P learns when they engage in conversations with the management of insurers when they decide to receive a full rating. Private information is, by its very nature, private.
One way to di¤erentiate between the two explanations is to see how often S&P and A.M Best agree on the …nancial quality of …rms they both review. In this case, the average …nancial quality of the …rms included in the analysis is constant which allows us to avoid having to use the predicted probabilities from hazard model. In addition, in one case A.M. Best and S&P both gain private information and, in the other, only A.M Best has the private information. Table 8 shows two frequency matrices where each matrix compares the ratings assigned to the …rm when the …rm is rated by both agencies Panel A of Table 8 compares the rating given by Best with the rating S&P issued when they used their full rating methodology. The results suggest A.M Best and S&P tended to agree in most cases about the …nancial health of the insurers they both oversaw over the time period. In 37 percent of the cases, Best and S&P agreed completely regarding the …nancial prospects of the insurers and they agreed to disagree only slightly on another 58 percent of the observations. It is also interesting to note that when S&P does diverge slightly from A.M. Best, they are more likely to issue a rating one category below the rating Best rather than one category above. There were very few cases, only 4.7 percent of the observations, where S&P and Best's completely disagreed about the …nancial health of the insurer. These results strengthen our earlier conclusion that, Clearly the standards S&P used to assign quali…ed ratings was signi…cantly more stringent than the standards they used in their full rating methodology. In addition, the results lend signi…cant credibility to the conclusion that S&P systematically chose insurers that would receive a quali…ed rating and then downgraded those insurers relative to what they would have received had they agree to pay to receive for a full unquali…ed rating.
A.M. Best' s Reaction to S&P' s Entry
Did Best react to S&P's entry into this market? It will be di¢ cult to …nd direct evidence Best reacted to the strategies S&P employed to enter the market for property-liability insurer ratings.
However, there is evidence Best did change their standards as competition for ratings increased.
For example, in previous research Doherty and Phillips (2002) used an ordered probit model to study the determinants of Best's ratings and report a signi…cant and negative relationship between Best's ratings and time after controlling for the …nancial quality of the …rm. Speci…cally, holding …rm quality constant, the authors showed an insurer could expect a 0.75 drop in rating category in the year 1999 relative to the standard that would have been applied in 1988.
We …nd similar results in this research. Table 9 The results in Panel A suggest there was no signi…cant time in the median probability of default for …rms assigned to any particular rating category except the lowest rated …rms.
However, in Panel B we …nd evidence of a signi…cant negative relationship between the median probabilities of default for …rms in the Good and Strong categories relative to the median probability of default for all rated …rms. For example, the average ratio of the median default probability for …rms in the Strong category relative to the median for all rated …rms over the years 1989-1991 was 1.0. This ratio dropped to be an average 0.75 for the last three years of this study. Thus, for at least the Strong and Good categories, we …nd evidence consistent with Best increasing stringency for …rms to achieve either "Good"and "Strong"ratings -results consistent with earlier reported by Doherty and Phillips (2002) . Table 7 Each panel shows the distribution of ratings issued by a particular rating agency over the time period of this study as well as summary statistics of the probability of default by rating category. Panel A displays statistics for firms that receive a full unqualified rating from S&P during the Table 9 Table displays the median probability of default for all insurers rated by A.M. Best by rating category. Panel A shows the median probability of default and Panel B shows the median probability for the individual rating category divided by the median probability of default for all firms that received a rating from A.M. Best. The table also displays the estimated beta coefficient β for the following time series regression: Med it = α + βt + ε it where Med it is the median probability of default for firms in rating category i in year t. The p-value is the is the probability associated with rejecting the null hypothesis H 0 : β = 0.
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